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Abstract
We consider an economy with incomplete markets and a single ¯rm
and assume that utility can be freely transferred in the form of the ini-
tially available good 0 (quasilinearity). In this particularly simple and
transparent framework, the objective of a ¯rm can be de¯ned as the max-
imization of the total utility of its control group C measured in units of
good 0. We analyze how the size and the composition of C in°uences the
¯rm's market behavior and state conditions under which the ¯rm sells its
output at prices which are at, above, or below marginal costs, respectively.
We discuss the assumption of competitive price perceptions and point out
important di®erences between the concepts of a Drµ eze and of a Grossman-
Hart equilibrium that occur in spite of the close similarity of the formulas
which de¯ne them.
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11 Introduction
The theory of incomplete markets deals with intertemporal economies with un-
certainty about future states of the world. Tradable assets can be used to transfer
wealth across time and states. However, the trading possibilities are restricted
because the asset span has less than full dimension. Once production is allowed
this fact entails conceptual problems which we examine in a particularly simple
setting.
We assume throughout the paper that utility can be transferred in the form
of the initially available good 0. As a consequence, the objective of a ¯rm can
be de¯ned as the maximization of the total utility sum (or welfare) of its control
group measured in units of good 0. We focus on the case of transferable utility
because of its transparency. Moreover, a general theory of incomplete markets
with production should not fail to handle this particular case appropriately.
We deviate from the Arrow-Debreu tradition and allow a ¯rm to take the
in°uence of its production decision on its stock price into account. It may happen,
though, that a ¯rm is controlled by a group of consumers who aim to sell the
¯rm's stock at marginal costs although the ¯rm is a monopolist. In this case, the
¯rm behaves in a similar way as a price taking ¯rm in the Arrow-Debreu setting
but not because it faces competition.
To avoid misinterpretations we do not refer to competitive behavior in this
case but to price taking behavior. Price taking behavior is de¯ned as pro¯t
maximization with respect to a given price system and entails that the output
is sold at marginal costs. A price taking ¯rm behaves as if it has adopted the
marginal cost pricing rule for some reason.
There are two time periods, t = 0 and t = 1, and one good per state which
bears the state's name. At t = 0, the economy is in state 0 and one of the
states s = 1;:::S will obtain at t = 1. Consumer i is endowed with ±i
j ¸ 0
original shares of ¯rm j.1 A stock market operates at t = 0 where original shares
are exchanged against good 0. Consumer i's ¯nal shares of ¯rm j are denoted
by #i
j ¸ 0. The price of all shares of ¯rm j is denoted qj. The demand for
shares depends on the production plans yj and the stock prices qj. In a stock




the supply, which is normalized to 1, for every j.
We adopt the framework of a corporation in the sense of Magill and Quinzii
(1996), x32, and assume that the group Oj of owners of ¯rm j's original shares
receives ¯rm j's net value. That is, consumer i receives ±i
jqj and pays the share
±i
j of j's production costs. The ¯nal owners of shares obtain the state dependent
dividends. Full insurance is impossible in incomplete markets and the success of
an investment can be associated with substantial risk.2
There are several reasons why consumers do, in general, not agree on the
objective of a ¯rm. First, a net seller of shares gains from a high share price
whereas a net buyer loses. Second, the original owners, who pay the production
1We will assume later that there is a single ¯rm. Because the literature we refer to in the
introduction typically deals with several ¯rms we use the index j here.
2An instructive example is Daimler-Chrysler. Looking backwards, this ¯rm has burned tens
of billions of Euros/US dollars in its short history.
2costs, tend to prefer lower production levels than the ¯nal owners, who receive the
output without paying the cost. Third, shares are assets whose bene¯ts depend
on the production plans. Because production decisions in°uence the asset span
and di®erent consumers face di®erent risks they do typically not agree on which
production plans ¯rms should carry out.
The importance of the three e®ects di®ers across consumers according to their
original endowments of shares and goods as well as their preferences. The assump-
tion of transferable utility allows us to capture all the aspects in a particularly
simple and transparent way.
Assume that ¯rm j is controlled by some group Cj of consumers. The mem-
bers of Cj typically di®er with respect to their individual characteristics and their
original and ¯nal shareholdings. The ownership structure matters because dif-
ferent control groups tend to pursue di®erent goals. Consider, for instance, the
extreme case in which the group Oj of original owners of ¯rm j never holds ¯nal
shares so that Oj is disjoint from the group Fj of j's ¯nal shareholders for all
production plans yj. If the ¯rm is controlled by Oj then the ¯rm's goal is to
maximize the net market value qj ¡ cj where cj denotes ¯rm j's cost. In this
case, shares will typically be traded at prices that exceed marginal costs.
On the other hand, if the ¯rm is controlled by its ¯nal rather than its original
owners the production level will be high and it can very well be optimal for Cj =
Fj to let the share price qj fall below marginal costs [cf. Section 4]. Deviations
from marginal cost pricing are rarely considered in the literature on incomplete
market economies with production and one would like to know when and why
this is justi¯ed. Note that we do not assume that ¯rms act as price takers.
To take another extreme case, suppose that all original and all ¯nal share-
holders belong to Cj for any production plan. Then the stock market price qj
ceases to play any role in the ¯rm's objective because a redistribution of good
0 among the members of Cj leaves Cj's aggregate utility una®ected. Since qj
becomes irrelevant in the case under consideration, the ¯rm's task is to ¯nd a
balance between today's cost cj and the future bene¯ts of its members. Such a
balance is found in the case of a Drµ eze equilibrium.
The concept of a Drµ eze equilibrium can be based on in¯nitesimal transfers of
good 0 and the following ¯rst order condition: The production plan of each ¯rm j
is such that the group Fj of j's ¯nal shareholders cannot change it in¯nitesimally
and make in¯nitesimal transfers of good 0 among its members such that every
i 2 Fj makes a ¯rst order utility gain. In¯nitesimal share adjustments need
not be taken into account because of the envelope theorem. Observe, though,
that the existence of in¯nitesimal utility gains is equivalent to the existence of
in¯nitesimal utility losses at an interior stock market equilibrium.
Drµ eze equilibria can also be de¯ned in other ways. Drµ eze (1974) aims at
constrained e±ciency of the whole economy. Consider a planner who cannot
split assets to alleviate the market incompleteness but who can choose production
plans, allocate shareholdings, and distribute the total endowments of good 0. An
allocation is constrained e±cient if this planner cannot make every consumer
better o®. Drµ eze equilibria can be characterized by the ¯rst order condition for
constrained e±ciency. If a stock market equilibrium is constrained e±cient it
must be a Drµ eze equilibrium.
3Drµ eze (1974) shows by means of several examples that a lack of coordination
among several ¯rms can entail that some Drµ eze equilibria are constrained ine±-
cient. Dierker et al. (2002) provide an example with a single ¯rm, a single good
per state (income), and a unique Drµ eze equilibrium that is constrained ine±cient.
Thus, there are economies in which the stock market cannot achieve a constraint
e±cient allocation.
E. and H. Dierker (2010a) focus on an example with von Neumann-Morgenstern
utilities and the same properties. Due to the cardinal nature of the utility func-
tions, this setting lends itself naturally to utilitarian welfare maximization, which
requires cardinal unit comparability. Shareholders' welfare is de¯ned as the sum
of their utilities where every utility function is normalized such that the marginal
utility of good 0 equals 1 at the Drµ eze equilibrium. It turns out that the unique
Drµ eze equilibrium maximizes social welfare although it is constrained ine±cient:
The more the ¯rm departs from the welfare maximizing Drµ eze equilibrium the
more shareholders' utilities increase after transfers and share adjustments. The
quasilinear case has the advantage that the goals of welfare maximization and
of constrained e±ciency are well aligned. E. and H. Dierker (2010b) exam-
ine the con°ict between welfare maximization and minimal e±ciency, which is a
substantially weaker requirement than constrained e±ciency.
In x31 of their book, Magill and Quinzii (1996) argue that Drµ eze equilibria
should be considered within the framework of partnership economies, which dif-
fers from the present setting in the following way. A partnership economy has
constant returns to scale, there are no original shares, and production costs are
borne by the ¯nal shareholders in proportion to their shares.
Although we adopt the framework of a corporation and not that of a part-
nership economy, we can make the following assumption within our framework
to reconcile the di®erent settings. Assume that returns to scale are constant and
that all ¯rms are controlled by the grand coalition G of all consumers. Then every

















where xi is i's equilibrium consumption, and DUi(xi) is i's utility gradient nor-
malized such that the partial derivative with respect to today's consumption
equals 1. Price taking behavior with respect to (1) provides an alternative char-
acterization of a Drµ eze equilibrium [cf. Magill and Quinzii (1996), 31.5 Proposi-
tion].3
If a price taking ¯rm has constant returns to scale then its pro¯ts are bound
to vanish. Equation (1) illustrates the remaining con°ict concerning its dividend.
Because markets are incomplete there are no budget hyperplanes that make the
individual utility gradients DUi(xi) point into the same direction. If every ¯nal
shareholder seeks to maximize pro¯ts with respect to some price system, then
shareholder i would like the ¯rm to maximize pro¯ts with respect to his state
price vector DUi(xi). The price system in (1) represents a compromise between
di®erent ¯nal shareholders.
3This characterization holds for general utility functions.
4Drµ eze (1974) does not assume price taking behavior but derives it from eco-
nomic principles. A ¯rm that is controlled by a group containing at least all its
customers has no reason to introduce a distortion that would harm them. This
point becomes particularly obvious if the group equals the grand coalition G and
the ¯rm cannot hope to raise its welfare by charging a price above marginal costs.
The argument tends to break down as soon as some customers are not included
in the control group.
The second equality in equation (1) is a pure tautology because #i
j = 0 for
every i 2 G n Fj. However, there are reasons to focus on G rather than on Fj.
If ¯rm j is controlled by G then nobody's interest is disregarded whatever the
production plan yj under consideration might be. The group Fj, however, dis-
regards potential shareholders, i.e., those consumers who would purchase shares
at a di®erent production plan. Furthermore, a common control group G can co-
ordinate the production decisions of di®erent ¯rms, whereas Drµ eze equilibria can
su®er from a coordination failure.
DeMarzo (1993) assumes that every ¯rm acts as a price taker and resolves the
con°ict among the shareholders di®erently. The decision of which price the ¯rm
takes as given is made by majority voting where each ¯nal share has one vote.
If an equilibrium outcome exists then ¯rm j's equilibrium production plan is
optimal for one, dominant shareholder i. That is to say, ¯rm j maximizes pro¯ts
with respect to the state price vector ¼j = DUi(xi) of shareholder i. DeMarzo's
approach is positive and power-oriented whereas Drµ eze's original approach is
normative and e±ciency oriented. For the purposes of positive analysis, Drµ eze
(1989) presents a new approach based on the following control principle: The
decision of a ¯rm must be approved by a majority of shareholders and by every
member of the board of directors.
Demichelis and Ritzberger (2010) analyze a model with complete markets,
imperfect competition and a single ¯rm that is controlled through the possibility
of shareholder voting. In contrast to the usual models, shares are traded before
the production plan is determined. A major motive to trade shares is to gain
control in the decision of the production plan. Active voters incur a small partic-
ipation cost and non-pivotal voters abstain. The ¯rm implements the preferred
production plan of its dominant shareholder. As in the present paper, it depends
on concentration of ownership whether shares are traded at or above marginal
costs.
Bejan and Bidian (2010) take up the question of when price taking behavior
arises in the limit if an economy with complete markets and imperfect competition
and production is replicated many times and show that the answer depends on
the distribution of shares.
We return to the case of incomplete markets. In an in°uential paper, Gross-
man and Hart (1979), or GH for short, consider an economy that lasts for T ¸ 2
periods. The extension to T > 2 periods is important because the stock market
opens more than once and future share prices enter the picture. GH assume that
the group of original shareholders determines the ¯rm's production plan.
Furthermore, GH write on p. 299: \We are making the assumption of \util-
ity taking," as opposed to price taking, behavior. ... Ostroy has emphasized
the equivalence between \no surplus" and competitive-like behavior. In Ostroy's
5terminology, our competitive price perception assumption implies that each con-
sumer believes that he will get no additional surplus out of his consumption of
the new security created by the change in the production plan."
GH have a speci¯c setting in their minds and refer to Hart's paper on monop-
olistic competition in a large economy. However, they do not provide an explicit
model of monopolistic competition with incomplete markets. Therefore, it is dif-
¯cult to see which assumptions are needed to provide an appropriate basis for
their approach.
The assumption of competitive price perceptions entails price taking behavior.










The striking similarity between (1) and (2) suggests a close similarity between
the cases in which the initial or the ¯nal shareholders control the ¯rm. However,
this viewpoint is deceptive.
GH explain the reason why ¯nal shares play the same role in equation (1) as
the initial shares do in equation (2) by the fact that the manager of the ¯rm is
acting in the interest of the ¯nal shareholders in the ¯rst case and in the interest
of the initial shareholders in the second. This leaves the following question open:
What is the manager supposed to accomplish if Fj and Oj coincide.
The original shares ±i
j serve to determine how ¯rm j's net value qj ¡ cj is
distributed. If returns to scale are constant and ¯rms act as price takers then
pro¯ts vanish at every stock market equilibrium. That is to say, j's net value is
identically equal to zero. The only motive that Oj can have in this case is to
insure its members against bad states at t = 1. This motive is captured by Oj's
¯nal and not by its original shares.
Competitive price perceptions entail that the objective of a ¯rm is determined
by an exogenously given distribution of shares that can be arbitrarily chosen. The
concept of a Drµ eze equilibrium has the advantage that it does not rely on any
perceptions and that the objective of a ¯rm depends on the optimal choice of
every consumer.
In Section 3, we present a simple, numerical example. We consider the case
of a single ¯rm and drop the index j. Thus, we do not try to model a situation
which GH had in their minds. Our conclusions are, however, to some extent
independent of the supply side. If the manager of the ¯rm acts in O's interest
by maximizing O's total utility then the ¯rm's goal is independent of how the
original shares ±i are allocated across O as long as the support of the distribution
does not change. We ¯nd it puzzling that the ±is are the important variables in
(2) if their redistribution leaves O's welfare invariant.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our framework
and focus on the Drµ eze rule. Grossman-Hart equilibria are discussed in Section 3.
In Section 4 we analyze the con°ict between original and ¯nal shareholders and
its impact on market power. Section 5 deals with competitive price perceptions
and Section 6 concludes.
62 Social welfare maximization and the Drµ eze
rule
To keep matters as simple as possible we use the following framework. As usual,
the subscript 0 refers to the state s = 0 and the subscript 1 refers to all states s =
1;¢¢¢ ;S at t = 1. A consumption vector is written as x = (x0;x1) 2 R
S+1
+ . Every
utility function takes the form Ui(x0;x1) = x0+V i(x1). The initial endowment of
consumer i is ei = (ei
0;ei
1) ¸ 0, where ei
0 is a (su±ciently large) positive number.
For convenience, we will set ei
1 = 0 in speci¯c examples. As a consequence, there
is no need for short sales.
There is a single ¯rm so that we can drop the index j. The ¯rm has the
technology Y ½ R¡£RS
+ which allows it to convert good 0 into a state dependent
output at t = 1. The only asset in the economy consists of shares in this ¯rm.
The ¯rm chooses an output vector y1 and incurs a cost of c(y1) units of good 0.
The production vector y = (y0;y1) with y0 = ¡c(y1) lies on the e±cient boundary
of the production set Y .
The cost c(y1) is borne by the original shareholders in proportion to their
initial shares ±i. Consumer i's demand for shares is denoted #i(y1). The ¯rm's
value q(y1) is determined by a market clearing condition. At a stock market
equilibrium, q(y1) is such that the total demand for shares
P
i2G #i(y1) equals 1.
A priori, it is not ruled out that the ¯rm possesses market power.
If the ¯rm produces y1 then i consumes xi(y1) = (ei
0 + (±i ¡ #i(y1))q(y1) ¡
±ic(y1);ei
















0 is C's initial endowment of good 0 and ±C its endowment of original
shares. The ¯rm aims to maximize the welfare of its control group C. We want
to relate welfare maximization to price taking behavior and the Drµ eze rule.
For simplicity's sake, we assume that (3) consists of C1 functions.4 If the
¯rm produces y1 and the associated technology gradient is ¼(y1) = (1;¼1(y1))
then the ¯rm's output is evaluated at marginal cost prices. That is to say,
¼1(y1)y1 = Dc(y1)y1. Furthermore, because the ¯nal shareholder i maximizes
utility given the stock market price q(y1), i's utility gradient at the optimum
is orthogonal to the ray through (¡q(y1);y1) along which agents trade. Thus,
(1;DV i(xi
1(y1)))(¡q(y1);y1) = 0 and we obtain DV i(xi
1)y1 = q(y1). All ¯nal
shareholders attribute the value DV i(xi
1)y1 = ¼1(y1)y1 = q(y1) to y1.
Proposition 1. Assume that the control group C of the monopolistic ¯rm con-
tains F [ O. If y1 maximizes C's welfare then y1 maximizes pro¯ts given the
4It is well-known that multiple equilibria can arise and that the equilibrium correspondence
need not possess a continuous selection. However, our goal is to shed light on economically















where xi is i's optimal consumption bundle. The optimal bundle y1 is sold at
marginal costs, that is to say, q(y1) = Dc(y1)y1.
Proof. If C instructs the ¯rm to produce y1 then C's consumption of good 0
becomes eC
0 ¡ c(y1). The market value q(y1) is irrelevant for C's consumption at
t = 0 since the members of C pay and receive q(y1) and the utility functions are
quasilinear. The original shares play no role since C's aggregate utility does not












Let vi(y1) = V i(ei
1 + #i(y1)y1). The ¯rst order condition for welfare maxi-









0 + (±i ¡ #i(y1))q(y1) ¡ ±ic(y1);ei
1 + #i(y1)y1) denotes i's opti-
mal consumption. If the ¯rm maximizes W C(y1) then it maximizes pro¯ts with
respect to ¼(y1) =
P
i2C #i(y1)DUi(xi). As shown in the paragraph preceding
Proposition 1, ¼1(y1)y1 = Dc(y1)y1.
The Drµ eze rule says that the marginal costs paid today equal the marginal
bene¯ts consumed tomorrow. Consumer i's marginal bene¯ts are proportional
to i's ¯nal shares #i(y1). If F [ O is contained in C the distribution of original
shares serves only to determine who belongs to O. Revenues play no role for C
and C bears the production costs. The insurance motive remains and is captured
by the Drµ eze rule.
Observe that the inclusion of F in C is a ¯xed point condition because F
depends on y1. Independence obtains if C equals G. The ¯rst order condition
for the maximization of G's welfare coincides with the ¯rst order condition for
constrained e±ciency. Therefore, our reasoning is in line with Drµ eze (1974).
The fact that the group F of ¯nal shareholders also appears in (4) should not
be misinterpreted. If F & O and C = F then F will typically not let the ¯rm
act according to (4) [see Proposition 3 in Section 4]. The reason is that we have
not adopted the framework of a partnership economy and the original shares are
an obligation to contribute to the production cost. Thus, C = F does not take
the production costs fully into account if F & O.
The Drµ eze rule presents a benchmark for the case in which not all original or
not all ¯nal shareholders belong to the control group. Both cases are investigated
in Section 4. The following corollary states that the original shareholders may
deviate from the GH rule, which is discussed in the next section.
Corollary 1. Assume the ¯rm is controlled by its original shareholders and F µ
O = C. Then the ¯rm follows the Drµ eze rule.
83 Grossman-Hart equilibria in a quasilinear ex-
ample
In the example, there are two types ¿ = 1;2 of consumers, N¿ persons of each
type and a single ¯rm. We do not aim to provide a framework with monopolistic
competition in the spirit of Grossman and Hart (1979) but want to explain some
di±culties arising in the present simple setting.
For convenience, we use the following terminology. Consumers of the same
type have the same preferences and initial endowments of goods. However, they
may di®er with respect to their original shares which can be varied parametrically.
S equals 2 and the utility functions for the two types are given by
U
1(x0;x1;x2) = x0 + 2log(x1) + log(x2);
U
2(x0;x1;x2) = x0 + log(x1) + 2log(x2);
(5)
respectively. Every consumer has the initial endowment (e0;0;0).
We assume that the costs to produce (y1;y2) are c(y1;y2) = yr
1+yr
2, where the
scale elasticity r ¸ 1. This allows us to consider constant and strictly decreasing
returns to scale.
We determine the asset demand for both types and the market clearing asset
price. Assume that the ¯rm's output equals (y1;y2). Shares of (y1;y2) can be
bought on the stock market. A consumer i of type 1 who decides to buy the share
#i consumes the bundle (ei
0 + ±i(q ¡ c) ¡ #iq; #iy1; #iy2) and obtains the utility
ei
0 + ±i(q ¡ c) ¡ #iq + 2log(#iy1) + log(#iy2). The utility maximizing amount of
#i is obtained if ¡q + 2=#i + 1=#i = 0. Therefore, the demand for shares of a
consumer of type 1 is given by #i = 3=q. Due to the symmetry of the types, the
demand for shares of a consumer of type 2 also equals #i = 3=q. Since there are
N = N1+N2 consumers, market clearing requires
Pi #i = 3N=q = 1. The ¯rm's
market value is q = 3N.
The fact that q is constant in (y1;y2) is remarkable for the following reason.
According to the assumption of competitive price perceptions in Grossman and
Hart (1979), the original shareholders, who do not know the function q, feel that
small output changes induce linear changes of q. Every shareholder uses his nor-
malized utility gradient at his optimal consumption plan to evaluate the change.
In the example, the assumption of competitive price perceptions is violated ev-
erywhere for every shareholder.
Competitive price perceptions have undesirable consequences. In the quasilin-
ear case, a redistribution of original shares within O is irrelevant for O's welfare.
However, the original shares ±i play a decisive role in a GH equilibrium where
the ¯rm maximizes pro¯ts with respect to the price system
P
i2O ±iDUi(xi). In
contrast to the Drµ eze rule, the GH rule is not oriented towards welfare and con-
strained e±ciency.
An important di®erence between ¯nal and original shares is the following.
Final shareholdings are chosen by economic agents, whereas original shareholdings
can be assigned arbitrarily. In our example, this fact has the following implication.
Consider two economies, E and ~ E. In economy E, the Drµ eze rule (1) is used
9whereas the GH rule (2) is applied in economy ~ E. There are N¿ consumers of
type ¿ in E and ~ N¿ in ~ E. The economies are of the same size, that is to say,
N1 + N2 = ~ N1 + ~ N2 = N. We have G = F = O in both economies so that price
taking behavior is well founded. Proposition 2 shows that the GH rule aims to
maximize welfare in an arti¯cial way because it is based on the original shares.
In the Grossman-Hart equilibrium of ~ E, the ¯rm aims to maximize the social
welfare in the wrong economy E.
Proposition 2. The original shares in ~ E can be assigned in such a way that the
unique Grossman-Hart equilibrium of ~ E coincides with the unique Drµ eze equilib-
rium of E.
Proof. To prove the claim, consider E and assume that the bundle (y1;y2) is
produced. The utility gradient of a consumer of type 1 is DU1(x0;x1;x2) =
(1;2=x1;1=x2) and that of a consumer of type 2 is DU2(x0;x1;x2) = (1;1=x1;2=x2).
Since the Drµ eze rule (1) is used in E and the consumption at t = 1 is the same for






































2 ). Hence, the
equilibrium output is y1 = ((2N1 + N2)=r)1=r and y2 = ((N1 + 2N2)=r)1=r. The
output is independent of how the original shares are distributed because the
utility functions are quasilinear.
Consider now economy ~ E, which implements a Grossman-Hart equilibrium,
and assign to each of the ~ N¿ consumers of type ¿ the original shares ±¿ =
N¿=( ~ N¿N). Then the weight of the utility gradient of type ¿ in the GH rule
(2) is ~ N¿±¿ = N¿=N. Therefore, the ¯rm maximizes pro¯ts with respect to the
price system ¼ as given by (6) and we obtain the same equilibrium production.
What matters for O's welfare is O's size and composition. However, our
example illustrates the following problem. The size of O can be changed without
any e®ect on the stock market by redistributing original shares within types.
For each type ¿ = 1;2, let ¹ ±¿ be the total number of original shares held by
all consumers of type ¿ and denote the normalized utility gradient of any such
consumer by ¼¿. Then the GH rule (2) becomes
¼ = ¹ ±
1¼
1 + ¹ ±
2¼
2: (7)
The degree of concentration of the original shares cannot be deduced from
(7). Suppose that all original shares are in the hands of one consumer of each
type and that C = O. Then the original owners can exploit the others by raising
prices above marginal costs.
In the next section we analyze how the distribution of original and ¯nal shares
in°uences the stock market price. In the ¯rst part the ¯rm is controlled by the
¯nal, in the second part by the original shareholders.
104 The con°ict between ¯nal and original share-
holders.
We have shown that the Drµ eze rule (1) results if the distributional con°icts at
t = 0 are internalized by a su±ciently large control group, for instance by G.5
However, an original shareholder i = 2 F receives ±i(q(y1) ¡ c(y1)) units of good 0
whereas a ¯nal shareholder i = 2 O pays #i(y1)q(y1) and neglects the costs when
he can in°uence the choice of y1. We argue that the market price q(y1) tends to
fall below its perfectly competitive level if the corporation is controlled by F.
For simplicity's sake, we assume that there are consumers who always buy
shares while the others never do so. That is to say, C = F is supposed to be
independent of the choice of the production plan y1. Deviations from the Drµ eze
rule occur if there are owners who do not belong to C.
We analyze these deviations. If the corporation produces y1 then i consumes
(ei
0 +(±i ¡#i(y1))q(y1)¡±ic(y1);ei
1 +#i(y1)y1). Let ±F denote the total amount
of original shares owned by F and eF
0 its initial endowment of good 0. De¯ne
vi(y1) = V i(ei























1 is i's optimal consumption at t = 1.
As shown immediately before Proposition 1, DV i(xi
1)y1 = q(y1) for every
i 2 F. That is to say, if i uses his utility gradient to evaluate y1 then the
resulting value DV i(xi
1)y1 coincides with y1's market value q(y1).
Therefore, if we use (9) to evaluate y1 we obtain the following relationship
between the market value q(y1) and y1's value ¼1(y1)y1 at marginal cost prices:
(1 ¡ ±
F)Dq(y1)y1 + ±
FDc(y1)y1 = q(y1): (10)
In the numerical example in Section 3, q(y1) is constant so that equation (10)
reduces to ±F¼1(y1)y1 = q(y1). If ±F = 1 we obtain a Drµ eze equilibrium and y1
is sold at marginal costs. However, if ±F falls below 1 then ¼1(y1)y1 = q(y1)=±F
exceeds q(y1).
This observation can be generalized as follows. Consider a given output vector
y1 À 0 and vary the scale ¸ of production. We assume that an in¯nitesimal
increase of ¸ decreases the pro¯t, that is to say, @¸(q(¸y1) ¡ c(¸y1))j¸=1 < 0.
Hence,
@¸q(¸y1)j¸=1 = Dq(y1)y1 < @¸c(¸y1)j¸=1 = Dc(y1))y1 : (11)
5There is also no con°ict at t = 0 in a partnership economy because there are no original
owners.
11Then we conclude from (10) that
q(y1) < (1 ¡ ±
F)Dc(y1)y1 + ±
FDc(y1)y1 = ¼1(y1)y1: (12)
Competitive pricing in the sense of Magill and Quinzii (1996), p.382, means
that q is a linear function. Then @¸q(¸y1)j¸=1 = 1 and the assumption @¸(q(¸y1)¡
c(¸y1))j¸=1 < 0 is satis¯ed if and only if we have decreasing returns to scale so
that @¸(c(¸y1) > 1.
Proposition 3. If y1 maximizes W F, @¸(q(¸y1)¡c(¸y1))j¸=1 < 0, and C = F %
O then the market value q(y1) is below its value ¼1(y1)y1 at marginal cost prices.
The question of who controls the ¯rm and the question of who has the power
to exploit whom are intrinsically related. If the ¯rm maximizes F's welfare and
there are original shareholders outside F then these shareholders are exploited.
Now we assume that the market power rests with O and argue that the market
price q(y1) tends to rise above its perfectly competitive level ¼1(y1). Let #O
denote the total amount of ¯nal shares owned by O and eO
0 its initial endowment
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and we obtain the ¯rst order condition
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If we take the inner product with y1 we obtain
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Consider the extreme case in which no member of O wants to hold ¯nal shares





and the ¯rm aims to maximize its net market value.
In our example, Dq vanishes and (15) becomes ¼1(y1)y1 = #Oq(y1) · q(y1);
where the inequality is strict provided #O < 1. In this case, y1 is sold with a
positive mark-up.
We assume now that @¸q(¸y1)=q(¸y1)j¸=1 < 1. That is to say, q grows by less
than 1% if y1 is increased by 1% and the boundary case of competitive pricing is
ruled out. Equation (15) is equivalent to
q(y1) ¡ ¼1(y1)y1 = (#
O(y1) ¡ 1)(Dq(y1)y1 ¡ q(y1)): (16)
Because #O(y1) < 1 and Dq(y1)y1 = @¸(q(¸y1) < q(y1)) by assumption we obtain
that (16) is positive, that is to say q(y1) > ¼1(y1)y1.
Proposition 4. If y1 maximizes W O, @¸(q(¸y1)=q(¸y1)j¸=1 < 1, and C = O % F
then q(y1) > ¼1(y1)y1.
To summarize, if the control group is so large that it contains O and F, for
instance if C = G, then C's welfare takes its maximum at a Drµ eze equilibrium and
q(y1) = ¼1(y1)y1. However, q(y1) can be below or above ¼1(y1)y1. The ¯rst case
arises if the ¯rm is controlled by F, the second if it is controlled by O.
125 Competitive price perceptions
The assumption of competitive price perceptions says that every individual i 2 O
uses his own utility gradient DV i(xi
1) at his optimal consumption given y1 to
evaluate alternative production plans. Thus, i thinks that q(y0
1) = DV i(xi
1)y0
1.
If transfers of good 0 are used to enable the winners of a potential change ¢y1
of y1 to compensate the losers one faces the following di±culty. Since markets
are incomplete DV i(xi
1)¢y1 will typically be positive for some consumers and
negative for others. The ¯rst group feels that the share price will go up while
the other group feels that it will go down if production is changed by ¢y1. If
O knows how to transfer good 0 from the members of the ¯rst group to the
members of the second group then O must be informed about which member
has which characteristics. In particular, it is known within O that the individual
price perceptions q(y0
1) = DV i(xi
1)y0
1 of O's members are incompatible with each
other. The members of O agree to disagree.
The assumption of competitive price perceptions serves the following purpose.
Suppose the ¯rm changes its output slightly from y1 to ^ y1 = y1 + ¢y1. In the
quasilinear case, i's utility at y1 is ei
0+±i[q(y1)¡c(y1)]¡#iq(y1)+V i(ei
1+#iy1).
The output change ¢y1 induces the ¯rst order utility change
¢U
i = ±







1 + #i(y1)y1. According to Grossman and Hart (1979), consumer
i, who does not know the function q, feels that, for any ¢y1, the utility change
DV i(xi
1)¢y1 at t = 1 is exactly o®set by the associated price change Dq(y1)¢y1.
That is to say, i feels that the second bracket Dq(y1)¡DV i(xi
1) in equation (17)
vanishes.
Competitive price perceptions have three important consequences for the con-
°ict among the original shareholders. First, they assume away their con°ict as
¯nal shareholders because they annihilate the second bracket in (17). Second,
they create a new con°ict among the members of O in their role as original
owners since the objective market value q(y1 + ¢y1) is replaced by a family of
subjective perceptions DVi(xi
1)¢y1. Third, whenever a ¯rm has market power it
is deprived of this power by the perceptions of its shareholders. That is to say, in
equilibrium we have q(y1) = ¼1(y1)y1. In the present setting this equality follows
immediately from the ¯rst order condition (16) and the de¯nition of competitive
price perceptions. If Dq(y1) = DV i(xi
1) then Dq(y1)y1 = DV i(xi
1)y1 = q(y1).
Therefore, the right hand side (#O(y1) ¡ 1)(Dq(y1)y1 ¡ q(y1)) of (16) vanishes
and we obtain q(y1) = ¼1(y1)y1.
In order to apply the assumption of competitive price perceptions we write
the ¯rst order condition (14) for O's welfare maximum explicitly as a sum of












1) = 0: (18)
When we replace (±i ¡ #i(y1))Dq(y1) by (±i ¡ #i(y1))DV i(xi
1) equation (18) re-






1) ¡ Dc(y1) = 0: (19)
Drµ eze equilibria have the merit that they do not rely on perceptions. The
control group is so large that it wants the ¯rm to act as a price taker. Thus, the
¯rm needs to know the value q(y1) but not the function q. In a GH equilibrium,
C = O can be a small group which would gain by selling y1 at a price above
¼1(y1)y1. We ignore this problem and consider only stock market equilibria
where ¯rms act as price takers. This fact as well as the ¯rm's technology are
assumed to be known to the members of C = O. We ask whether this knowledge
can be helpful.
The optimal choice of a stock market equilibrium in which ¯rms act as price
takers by assumption presents a constrained optimization problem. Its analysis
requires at least some local knowledge about the set of feasible equilibria. If such
knowledge is not available because only the value of q at ¹ y1 is known one can
either resort to some kind of perceived knowledge or one can ask whether there is
a desirable goal that can be reached given information that is actually available
to O.
To illustrate the latter approach, consider an economy with quasilinear and
quasiconcave utilities and a technology with constant scale elasticity r ¸ 1 as in
our example. Suppose O has to evaluate the stock market equilibrium associated
with the production plan (¹ y0; ¹ y1) and the technology gradient (1; ¹ ¼1). Consider
the ¯xed cost level ¹ c = j¹ y0j. Then all y1 with c(y1) = ¹ c have the same value
¹ q = r¹ c and yield the same pro¯t (r ¡ 1)¹ c at marginal costs prices (normalized
technology gradients). Among these bundles, the original shareholders prefer the
bundle y1 that constitutes their optimal output mix.
More precisely, let Y¹ c denote the image of the technology section f(y0;y1) 2
Y jy0 = ¡¹ cg under the projection projS : R1 £ RS ! RS. Similarly, consider
the set of O's aggregate preferred net trades P O = fxi ¡ eijxi Â xi(¹ y1))g and
denote the image of P O \ (f¡¹ cg £ RS) under projS by P O
¹ c . We multiply Y¹ c
with O's ¯nal shares ¹ #O =
P
i2O #i(y1) at y1. Observe that ¹ y1 lies on the
boundaries of the convex and disjoint sets Y¹ c and P O
¹ c . The optimality of O's




i2O(#i(¹ y1)DV i(¹ xi
1) must be proportional
to ¹ ¼1. In analogy to the Drµ eze rule, the technology gradient (1; ¹ ¼1) is set equal
to the convex combination
P
i2O(#i(y1)=¹ #O)DUi(¹ xi). On the basis of this rule,
O can instruct the ¯rm to implement its optimal output mix at a marginal cost
pricing equilibrium without knowledge of the function q.
This goal is particularly natural if the scale elasticity r is equal to 1 since
pro¯ts are identically equal to 0 in the case of price taking behavior so that
the pro¯t motive vanishes completely. In our numerical example, the above
procedure entails that the original shareholders maximize their welfare subject
to the constraint of price taking behavior because all stock market equilibria are
associated with the same cost level.
6The assumption of quasiconcavity allows us to formulate the argument within RS.
14If one wants to base the objective of a ¯rm on the original shares then these
shareholdings should be derived from economic considerations. Suppose that
every consumer i had a chance to acquire original shares at period t = ¡1 and
that i knows that his interests will be included in the ¯rm's objective at t = 0
provided #i > 0. Then every i has an incentive to possess at least one zillionth
of these shares. In this case, the ¯rm is controlled by O = G and #O = 1. Then
q drops out of the objective function (13) and the problem disappears.
6 Conclusions
This paper aims to examine the role of the ownership structure and the control
rights in a particularly simple and transparent setting. Because good 0 can be
used to transfer utility the ¯rm's objective can be de¯ned as the maximization
of a function, the welfare or total utility of its control group C. The fact that
the welfare of the whole group C rather than each individual utility gain or loss
matters has important implications.
Assume that the ¯rm is controlled by O. If C = O is so large that it contains
all ¯nal shareholders then the market value q does not enter C's welfare even if
all its individual members are a®ected by q. As a consequence, there is no need
for price perceptions in this case and O's welfare maximum is attained at a Drµ eze
equilibrium and not at a GH equilibrium.
Furthermore, a redistribution of the original shares ±i within C = O does not
have any e®ect on O's welfare as long as nobody loses all his original shares so
that O shrinks. Therefore, the weights ±i of the utility gradients in the de¯nition
of a GH equilibrium do not enter the ¯rm's objective in the transferable utility
case beyond the fact that they determine the members of O. The fact that
the welfare neutral original shares serve as weights of the utility gradients in a
GH equilibrium is a pure consequence of the shareholders' perceptions of their
problem.
The assumption of competitive price perceptions combines two aspects. The
¯rst, competitive pricing, says that the stock market value q is supposed to be
a linear function. Second, each consumer i feels that q(y1) coincides with i's
marginal utility evaluation DV i(xi)y1 of y1. This implies that y1 is sold at
marginal costs independently of whether this lies in C's genuine interest.
We have presented a numerical example in which no original shareholder sat-
is¯es the assumption of competitive price perceptions for any production decision
of the ¯rm. In the example, the function q is constant rather than linear.
The question of whether the ¯rm should be priced at, above, or below marginal
costs depends on the ownership structure and control in the following way. If the
¯rm is controlled by its original shareholders and F is not fully contained in O
then C has an incentive to sell its stock at a price q(y1) above marginal costs
¼1(y1)y1.
However, if the ¯rm is controlled by its ¯nal shareholders and O is not con-
tained in F then C has an incentive to charge a price below marginal costs since
all costs are borne by the original shareholders in our setting so that a positive
15fraction of the costs is not accounted for by C.
The Drµ eze rule results if C ¶ (F[O) and q(y1) = ¼1(y1)y1. The case of C = G
is particularly important from a welfare perspective because every consumer's
interest is taken into account. If C = F is smaller than G then those consumers
who would hold ¯nal shares at an alternative production plan are ignored.7
The last three paragraphs shed light on the need for price perceptions in the
quasilinear case. Assume it is optimal for C = O to sell its output at marginal
costs although the ¯rm is not forced to do so by ¯erce competition. Then O must
contain F. Therefore, C does not need to know q and O's welfare optimum is a
Drµ eze equilibrium.
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